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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

CaseNo.20020376-CA

KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEIL
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appealsfroma judgment of conviction for theft by deception, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999); identityfraud,a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2001); and forgery, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) (statutes in
Addendum A).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (2002).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether two of defendant's three convictions
merge either because their statutory elements, as a matter of law, create a greater-lesser

relationship between the offenses or because, based on the facts specific to this case, the
convictions all rest upon the same act and, hence, stand in a greater-lesser relationship.
"Whether one crime is a lesser included offense of another is a question of law
reviewed for correctness." State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611,617-18 (Utah App. 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are particularly relevant to resolution of the issue presented
on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. .§ 76-6-501 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2001) (all in Add. A); and
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999) (in Add. C);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1999) (in Add. F).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with theft by deception and identityfraud,both second
degree felonies, and forgery, a third degree felony, based on conduct occurring March 1,
2001 (R. 2-3). The court appointed counsel for defendant, and, following a preliminary
hearing, bound defendant over for trial (R. 17,25,27-29, 31-32). The defense at trial was
one of mistaken identity (R. 173: 10-12,153-68). After the State presented its case-inchief, defendant moved for a directed verdict (R. 122-23; R. 173: 98-113). He argued
that the State had adduced insufficient evidence to support the charges, that the charges
arose from a single episode and should give rise to a single charge, and that the offenses
were essentially lesser included ones, again permitting conviction of only a single charge
2

for defendant's conduct (R. 173: 98-114). The district court denied the motion in its
entirety and submitted the case to the jury (R. 173: 107-13, 174-75). The jury convicted
defendant as charged (R. 115-17).
Following preparation of a presentence report, the district court judge sentenced
defendant to the Utah State Prison for one-to-fifteen years on each second degree felony
and zero-to-five years on the third degree felony, with the time to run concurrent for each
charge but consecutive to a sentence defendant was to serve in Idaho (R. 121,132-33,
137-39). Defendant timely appealed (R. 159-60).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Kevin Chukes walked into Crown Bedroom Furniture the morning of
March 1,2001, and spent a few minutes looking around the store (R. 173: 14, 16,18). He
then spoke with a salesman, Clark Grimshaw, and ultimately decided to purchase a
bedroom set (R. 173: 16,18-19,21-23). Defendant explained that he needed the set
delivered that day, but Grimshaw told him that they did not have the set in stock and
could not deliver it that day (R. 173: 118,121). Grimshaw then offered to let defendant
purchase the display model and to disassemble it for him, but that defendant would have
to make his own arrangements to pick it up (R. 173: 21). Defendant agreed and stated
that he wanted to finance the purchase (R. 173: 21, 23).
Defendant filled out a credit application, printing in the boxes provided
information such as the name, date of birth, social security number, and address of Jeffrey
Mewborn (R. 173: 24-26; St's Exh. 2). He then signed the name "Jeffrey Mewborn"
3

["JM"] on the application (R. 173: 24-25; St's Exh. 2). Grimshaw explained that there
would be a few minutes wait while the form was faxed to American General Finance for
verification and approval or rejection (R. 173: 23-24, 26). Defendant complained of other
pressing matters and left the store with a promise to call later for the results (R. 173: 2627). He had been in the store for a total of approximately half an hour (R. 173: 27).
Defendant called within the next hour, spoke to Grimshaw, and identified himself
as Jeffrey Mewborn (R. 173: 29). He was told that the loan had been approved, and that
he would need to return to sign the sales contract (R. 173: 29-30). Defendant returned to
the store later that afternoon (R. 173: 31). Grimshaw had the sales contract filled out for
him, explained the terms of the sale to him, and watched as defendant signed the form
with the name "Jeffrey Mewborn" (R. 173: 31-33; St's Exh. 1). Defendant also signed
the name "Jeffrey Mewborn" to the bottom of the sales receipt, which detailed the pieces
he had bought and reflected a total of $5,955.35 (R. 173: 34-36; St's Exh. 3). Over the
next half hour, Grimshaw and defendant, with some help from another salesman, loaded
everything onto a truck defendant had brought with him (R. 173: 39). Defendant left with
the bedroom set, had no further contact with the store, and made no payments on the
furniture (R. 173: 38-40,48).
In early March 2001, Jeffrey Mewborn discovered that someone had his personal
information and was using it to purchase things in his name (R. 173: 73). He contacted
several credit bureaus and learned that American General Finance had recently financed a
purchase (id.). He contacted them to alert them to the situation, and contacted the police
4

(R. 173: 73, 77). He testified that the signatures on the three Crown Bedroom documents
were his name but not his writing, verified the accuracy of the information included on
the credit application as being his, denied knowing defendant or ever giving him the
personal information, and denied ever giving defendant permission to use that
information, to make the purchase on his behalf, or to sign his name (R. 173: 67-72).
Two weeks after defendant's purchase, Detective Robin Wilkins showed
Grimshaw a photo line-upfromwhich Grimshaw immediately chose defendant's
photograph as the man who represented himself to be Jeffrey Mewbom (R. 173: 40-43,
47, 64, 80, 84).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that his three convictions should merge into one as a matter of
law and that the three convictions are necessarily based upon the same act and same
evidence as the remaining convictions. However, his claims fail upon a comparison of
the specific elements of the variations of each of the three offenses and of the facts
established in this case. While Utah law forbids punishing a defendant twice for a single
act, a defendant may be convicted for offenses arising out of separate acts. Here, the jury
was able to base defendant's guilt for each offense on a set of facts which required proof
of at least one additional fact to establish an additional element necessary for conviction
of the other two offenses. Consequently, defendant fails to establish any greater-lesser
relationship between the variations of the offenses relevant to this case, and his
convictions should be affirmed.
5

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF THEFT BY
DECEPTION, IDENTITY FRAUD, AND FORGERY
Defendant claims that he committed one crime and should be convicted of a single
offense. Specifically, he argues that, as a matter of law, forgery is a lesser included
offense of identity fraud and theft by deception, and that identity fraud is a lesser included
offense of theft by deception. Br. of Aplt. at 7,10-32. Because he cannot be convicted of
a greater and a lesser offense, he reasons, the forgery and identity fraud convictions
necessarily merge into the greater theft by deception conviction. Id. at 7,32. He also
contends that his convictions for forgery and identity fraud should be vacated because
these offenses, together with the offense of theft by deception, were based upon the same
acts established by the same facts at trial. Id. at 32-38. However, contrary to defendant's
arguments, his convictions do not merge and two should not be vacated because not only
do the statutory elements of each offense differ such that each of the offenses may be
committed without necessarily committing the others, but, under the specific variations of
the offenses proven at trial in this case, his convictions may be based on separate acts.
A.

Trial court's ruling
Following the State's case-in-chief, defendant moved to have the charges reduced

to a third degree forgery charge, arguing that the State had "taken one charge, one crime,
and divided it up into three different categories[,]" that he was being charged three times
for "the same conduct for the same crime[,]" and that, under State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d
6

343,453 P.2d 146 (1969), he was entitled to be charged with the crime carrying the lesser
degree (R. 173: 98-107). The trial judge heard argument, then denied the motion (ruling
in Addendum B). The judge noted that he, too, had concerns about the charges, had
reviewed the statutes and the issue, and had listened to counsel's arguments (R. 173: 10708). Add. B. He then ruled that any overlap in the statutes did not encompass the entirety
of each offense and that each offense had "different and additional elements" which
prevented themfrommerging as a matter of law (id.). Add. B. He provided examples of
those differences, recognized that the evidence reflected those differences, and ruled that
the Information "appropriately charged [defendant's conduct] as three separate offenses"
(R. 173: 108-12). Add. B.
!£•

Defendant's claim fails because the offenses include different statutory
elements established bv different evidence, rendering merger inapplicable
Merger is required if a defendant is convicted of both a charged offense and a

lesser included offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) (in Addendum C).1 The
Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-tiered analysis to determine whether two offenses
1

Under section 76-1-402(1):
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for
all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant under a single
criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such
provision....

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401(1) (1999). Add. C.
7

have the relationship of greater and lesser included offenses. See State v. Betha, 957 P.2d
611, 618 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,241 (Utah App. 1997); see also
State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1995); State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96,97 (Utah
1983). "[T]he first step is a purely theoretical comparison of the statutory elements of
each offense." Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861; Hill, 674 P.2d at 97; see also Betha, 957 P.2d at
618. When examining the elements, if it is found that one (the greater) crime "cannot be
committed without necessarily having committed" the other (lesser) crime, the lesser
crime merges into the greater crime, and a defendant cannot be convicted for both crimes.
Betha, 957 P.2d at 619; Ross, 951 P.2d at 241.
Some criminal statutes, however, have multiple variations or elements, so that a
greater-lesser relationship may exist between some variations of the crimes, but not
others. Betha, 957 P.2d at 618; Ross, 951 P.2d at 241; see also Hill, 61A P.2d at 98. In
such a case, the court must apply a secondary test and look to the evidence presented at
trial to determine what variation of the crime or crimes was proved and then "look[] to the
statutory elements of the crime to determine whether it is an included offense." State v.
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 16,994 P.2d 1243; see also Betha, 957 P.2d at 618; Ross, 951
P.2d at 240.
Defendant asserts that forgery is a lesser included offense of identityfraudand that
both these offenses are lesser included offenses of theft by deception as a matter of law.
Br. of Aplt. at 6-32. Defendant also contends that all of the evidence necessary to
establish forgery in this case was also necessary to establish identityfraud,and that all the
8

evidence necessary to establish identity fraud was, in turn, necessary to establish the
deception required for the theft by deception conviction. Id. at 32-38. He argues that
under the single criminal episode doctrine set forth in section 76-1-402, where the same
evidence supports multiple convictions, only one of the convictions may be affirmed. Br.
ofAplt. at 33.
While the statutory definitions of the charged offenses allow for the commission of
each offense without necessarily committing either of the other offenses2, there are
variations of theft by deception and forgery which require consideration of the evidence

2

Each offense requires at least one element not required for the remaining offenses,
permitting for the commission of each offense without necessarily committing the
remaining two. For example, when forgery is committed with a signature that "purports
to be that of a real person, falsity may be shown by evidence that the person whose name
is signed did not make or authorize the signature." See State v. Jones, 81 Utah 503, 20
P.2d 614, 617 (1933). No such lack of authority is required in order to establish the
offense of theft by deception. See State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472,474 (Utah App. 1987)
(no element of "unauthorized" control is required to establish theft by deception under
section 76-6-405). Conversely, theft by deception requires the acquisition and exercise of
control over the property of another, which is not required for a forgery conviction.
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999) and §76-6-501 (1999). Add. A.
Similarly, forgery requires the use of a "writing," which element is not required for
an identity fraud conviction. Compare Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 and §76-6-1102
(Supp. 2001). Add. A. Identity fraud requires the acquisition and use or attempted use of
personal identifying information of an existent person. See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-1102.
Add. A. These elements are not required for a forgery conviction. See Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-501. Add. A.
Finally, the acquisition and exercise of control over the property of another which
is required for theft by deception is not required for identity fraud. Compare Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-405 and §76-6-1102. Add. A. Conversely, identity fraud requires proof of a
lack of authority in the acquisition and use of the personal information. Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-1102. Add. A. No similar requirement is necessary for theft by deception. Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-405. Add. A.
9

adduced at trial to determine whether a greater-lesser relationship exists among the
offenses proven in this case. See Betha, 957 P.2d at 618; Ross, 951 P.2d at 241. A
comparison of the evidence reveals that the jury was required to find a fact for each
offense that was not required for either of the other offenses, defeating defendant's claim
that a greater-lesser relationship exists between all of the offenses of which defendant was
convicted in this case.
L A determination that defendant committed identity fraud on the
facts at hand did not permit his conviction of forgery without
additionai evidence and an additional finding
Under the facts of this case, the conduct establishing identity fraud and forgery
were not necessarily based on the same act. See State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 205, f 16,
29 P.3d 25, cert, granted, 32 P.3d 247 (LItah Sep. 26,2001). Acts are independent if they
are in no way necessary to each other or are sufficiently separated by time and place. See
id. at f 17 (aggravated assault and attempted murder were not necessary to each other and
were separated by time, place, and intervening circumstances); see also State v. Young,
780 P.2d 1233,1239 (Utah 1989) (forcible sexual abuse and forcible sodomy supported
two counts of aggravated sexual assault because they were in no way necessary to each
other). In this case, both offenses required a lack of authority by JM, but each was based
on separate conduct of defendant.
The jury was instructed on forgery under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1 )(b) (1999)
(Add. A), which provides:

10

(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating afraudto be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues,
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the
making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance,
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of
another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence
other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when
no such original existed.
(R. 90-94; jury instructions in Addendum D). Additionally, where forgery is established
with a signature that "purports to be that of a real person, falsity may be shown by
evidence that the person whose name is signed did not make or authorize the signature." *
See State v. Jones, 81 Utah 503,20 P.2d 614, 617 (1933) (it is not enough that the proof
shows that the person whose name was signed did not sign it; proof must also show that
the name was signed without authority).3
Identityfraudunder Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2) & (3) (Supp. 2001) (Add. A),
requires that defendant:
(1) knowingly or intentionally;
(2) obtain personal identifying information of another person;
(3) without that person's authorization; and that he
3

Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously included in the forgery jury
instruction the requirement of lack of authority, among other things. Br. of Aplt. at 1112. Not only is the requirement necessary where the forgery is based on the signing of a
real person's name, Jones, 20 P.2d at 617, but defendant expressly waives any issue as to
the accuracy of the instructions. Id. at 12. Consequently, the State does not address the
issue.
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(4) use, or attempt to use, that information withfraudulentintent, including to
obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, any other thing of value in the
name of the other person without that person's consent; and
(5) the value of the thing obtained exceeds $5,000.00.
(Br. of Aplt. at 12; R. 88, jury instruction in Addendum D).
The prosecutor argued that the personal identifying information included JM's
name and accurate date of birth, social security number and Stockbridge, Georgia address
as defendant printed them on the top of the credit card application (R. 173: 140; St's Exh.
2, attached in Addendum E). That defendant knowingly or intentionally obtained this
information without JM's consent was established by his placement of the information on
the credit application and by JM's testimony that he did not know defendant and had
neither given him the information nor permitted him to use it. Hisfraudulentintent in
using or attempting to use the information was established by his statement to the
salesman that he wanted to purchase the bedroom furniture on credit, following which he
proceeded to fill out the requisite credit application with JM's name and information.
The final requirement, defendant's attempt to use the information without JM's consent,
was complete upon proof that hefilledin the top of the credit application with the
specific, accurate personal identifying information that not only purported to be JM's
information but in fact was his information, and that JM did not give him permission to
use the information (St's Exh. 2). Add. E. At this point, all die requisite facts for a
conviction of identity fraud have been established.

12

However, because anyone could fill in a form with such information without
necessarily committing a forgery, something else was required before the jury could find
that defendant committed forgery. The prosecutor argued in opening and closing remarks
that a forgery in this case occurred each time defendant signed Jeffrey Mewborn's name
to one of the three documents he executed at Crown Bedrooms (R. 173: 7,141-42).
Consequently, forgery would arisefromdefendant's additional act of signing JM's name
to the written credit application so that the execution "purports to be the act of another[.]"
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. Defendant thereafter represented himself verbally to be
Jeffrey Mewbom and signed two more documents with Mewborn's name, committing
multiple forgeries based on conduct unnecessary to his identityfraudconviction in his
effort to obtain credit and property in the course of his interaction with Crown Bedroom.
Consequently, completion of the specific identifying information on the top of the
form (identityfraud)and forgery of JM's signature at the bottom of the form constitute
independent acts for which defendant may justifiably be convicted of two offenses. See
Casey, 2001 UT App 205, ft 18-20.
2. Afindingof theft bv deception did not permit conviction of identity
fraud or forgery without additional evidence and findings
Theft by deception requires proof that defendant:
(1) obtains or exercises control over the property of another
(2) by deception and
(3) with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

13

See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405(1) (1999). Add. A. The second element, "by
deception," consists of three separate components: "(1) that defendant's acts satisfied the
statutory definition of deception, (2) that the deception occurred contemporaneously with
the transaction in question, and (3) that the victim relied upon the deception, at least to
some extent, in parting with property." See State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 685-86 (Utah
App.), cert denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).4
The deception, as defined by statute and explained in the jury instructions, can
occur when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is
false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect the
judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously
created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment of
another and that the actor does not now believe to be true; or
(c) Prevents anotherfromacquiring information likely to affect his judgment in the
transaction; or

(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the
transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or knows will
not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the promise in issue
without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor
did not intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.

4

The fact that the State argues only the "deception" element of the offense of theft
by deception is not intended as a concession that the remaining elements of the offense
cannot be distinguished from the elements required for identityfraudor forgery. The
State addresses the "deception" element alone because it defeats defendant's argument,
and further discussion of the elements is not warranted.
14

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (1999) (in Addendum F); R. 81-82 (jury instructions in
Addendum D)
Defendant claims that regardless of which subsection the jury used, they
necessarily found all the facts necessary to establish the additional crimes of identity
fraud and forgery, permitting affirmance of only the theft by deception charge. Br. of
Aplt. at 34-38. However, after finding the requisite deception under any of these four
subsections, the jury would still be required tofindan additional element before it could
find defendant guilty of the remaining two offenses.5
Subsection (a):
Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is
false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect
the judgment of another in the transaction^]
This is the most likely subsection relied on by the jury inasmuch as the credit
application contained JM's detailed personal identifying information and was the basis
upon which defendant was able to obtain both credit and the bedroom furniture. Under
this subsection of theft by deception and the facts of this case, the jury mustfindthat
defendant created a false impression knowing it to be false and knowing that the false

5

Although theft by deception and identity fraud are both second degree felonies,
defendant treats theft by deception as the greater crime for the simple reason that theft by
deception requires at least one additional element not addressed in the identity fraud
statute: acquisition and exercise of control over the property. Compare Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-405 and § 76-6-1102. Add. A.
15

impression would likely affect the judgment of the credit company or the salesman. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40l(5)(a). Add. F.
In this case, the jury could have found that defendant committed theft by deception
under this subsection by taking into account all the facts proven at trial except the fact of
authority necessary for the additional two offenses: lack of authority to obtain and use the
personal information (identityfraud)and lack of authority to sign JM's name (forgery).
That defendant obtained and exercised control over property of another is undisputed: he
obtained and used more than $5,000 worth of credit, and he left the store at the end of the
day with the bedroom set. The deception under subsection (a) arises from defendant's
words and conduct surrounding the transaction. He comes in, chooses furniture,
expresses a desire to purchase it himself on credit, completes the credit application with
information that is not his own, signs the credit application-and two additional documents
necessary to obtain the furniture-with a name that is not his own, represents himself to be
that person when he calls the store to check the status of the credit application, and in all
relevant ways acts to convince the salesman and the credit company that he is JM. There
is no evidence that he believed himself to be JM, and JM himself testified as to his own
identity.
Even assuming that defendant had authority to sign JM's name, which is not a fact
before this jury, the judgment of at least the credit company is likely to have been
affected by defendant's misrepresentation of himself as being JM because the company
would, in all likelihood, have sought verification of the claimed authority-something
16

unnecessary under the facts of this case. Regardless of the existence of authority,
defendant's representation of himself as being JM created the deception required under
subsection (a) and led both the credit company and the salesman to make their decision to
provide him with credit and/or furniture based on that deception. Moreover, the requisite
intent to deprive is established by the fact of defendant's representation of himself as
being JM together with the fact that payment was not thereafter made on the bedroom
furniture.
Consequently, the jury could find defendant guilty of theft by deception and still
require additional evidence to establish the lack of authority required for each of the
additional offenses of identityfraudand forgery.
Subsection (b):
Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously
created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to affect the
judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe to be true[.]
Deception under this subsection would be established by the proof required for
subsection (a) and the fact that at no time did defendant ever attempt to correct the false
impression he created that he was JM, despite ample opportunity to do so. Nothing
required to establish the requisite deception under this subsection alleviates the need for
the additional findings of lack of authority required for a conviction of identityfraudand
forgery.

17

Subsection (c):
Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in
the transaction^]
This subsection may be established by means of the credit application or by all of
the evidence outlined above for subsection (a). Defendant's use on the credit application
of JM's name and accurate identifying information prevented the salesman and the credit
company from suspecting that further inquiry was warranted and gave them no
opportunity to discover the information they truly sought: defendant's own identity and
credit information. The remainder of the deception established in subsection (a) is
relevant here as well because the totality of defendant's conduct and representations
throughout the transaction prevented the credit company and the salesman from
suspecting at any time that defendant was not really JM andfromdetermining that they
did not have the information they believed they had-defendant's own information-upon
which to base their decision to give him credit and the bedroom furniture. The relevance
of this information to the decision of both the credit company and the salesman is
undeniable.
Even if defendant had authority to obtain and/or use JM's signature and
information, his failure to disclose it would still amount to a deception under this
subsection because his charade as to his identity led the salesman and the credit company
to believe something that was not true and to give credit and furniture to defendant based
on that false belief

18

Accordingly, the question of defendant's authority either to obtain or to use JM's
signature and personal information is irrelevant to establishment of a deception under this
subsection, and the jury must find that authority based on additional evidence before it
could convict defendant of identityfraudand forgery.
Subsection (e):
Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the
transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the
promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not
sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise
would not be performed.
The deception under this subsection necessarily arisesfromthe sales contract
inasmuch as the contract purported to bind defendant as "JM" to make future payments
for the furniture, which payments he did not intend to make. This was the only
performance defendant promised to make. His signing of the sales contract undeniably
affected the judgment of the credit company and the salesman inasmuch as the contract
contained all the terms, rights, and conditions relative to the sale and release of the
furniture. Defendant's lack of intent to perform on the promise to pay rests on his
charade of being JM and his use of JM's name on the sales contract without revealing that
he was not, in fact, JM, together with his failure thereafter to make any payments. The
jury need not find that defendant knew the promise would not be performed by JM so
long as they find that defendant, himself, did not intend to perform it. See Utah Code

19

Ann. § 76-6-40 l(5)(e) ( " . . . which performance the actor does not intend to perform or
knows will not be performed ...") (emphasis added). Add. F.
Consequently, defendant's authority, or lack thereof, to possess JM's information
and to sign his name has no bearing on the jury's ability to convict defendant of theft by
deception based on the deception in subsection (e). The three convictions, therefore, do
not rest on the same facts, and defendant's claim to the contrary fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
defendant's convictions and sentences.
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
This case does not present a novel or important issue. Consequently, the State
does not ask that the matter be set for oral airgument or that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _0

day of January, 2003.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

76-6-405. Theft by deception.
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely
to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to
the public or to a class or group.

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED

History: C. IMS, 76-6-466, enacted by L.
1*71, ch. 196, I 76-6-466.

1953
PARTS
FRAUD

VOLUME 8B
1999 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77

76-6-601. Forgery —Writing" defined.
( D A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing 9 includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including
forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks,
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued
by a government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1963, 76-6-601, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 196, I 7641401; 1974, eh. 3 2 , 1 19;
1975, ch. 69, I 1; 1996, ch. 291, I 16; 1996,
eh. 206,1 27.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1996, incorporated
former Subsection (3), which had set out the
elements of second degree forgery, into Subsection (2); deleted "with a face amount of $100 or
more* after "a check" in Subsection (2Xc); de-

leted "if the writing is or purports to be a check
with a face amount of less than $100; all other
forgery is a class A misdemeanor" from the end
of Subsection (3); and made minor stylistic
changes throughout the section
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, in Subsection (2) added "electronic storage or transmission" and substituted "valuable
information including forms such as" for "information," making related stylistic changes.

7041.1102. Identity fraud crime.

UTAH CODE
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(1) For purposes of this part, "personal identifying information" may include:
(a) name;
(b) address;
(c) telephone number;
(d) driver's license number;
(e) Social Security number;
(f) place of employment;
(g) employee identification numbers or other personal identification
numbers;
(h) mother's maiden name;
(i) electronic identification numbers;
(j) digital signatures or a private key; or
(k) any other numbers or information that can be used to access a
person's financial resources or medical information in the name of another
person without the consent of that person except for numbers or information that can be prosecuted as financial transaction card offenses under
Sections 76-6-606 through 76-6-506.4.
(2) A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person knowingly or
intentionally:
(a) obtains personal identifying information of another person without
the authorization of that person; and
(b) uses, or attempts to use, that information with fraudulent intent,
including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, any other
thing of value, or medical information in the name of another person
without the consent of that person.
(3) Identity fraud is:
(a) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the credit, goods, services, or
any other thing of value is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor if:
(i) a value cannot be determined and the personal identifying
information has been used to obtain medical information in the name
of another person without the consent of that person; or
(ii) the value of the credit, goods, services, or any other thing of
value is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or any
other thing of value is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $6,000; or
(d) a second degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or
any other thing of value is or exceeds $6,000.
(4) Multiple violations within a 90-day period may be aggregated into a
single offense, and the degree of the offense is determined by the total value of
all credit, goods, services, or any other thing of value used, or attempted to be
used, through the multiple violations.
History: C. IMS, 76-6-110X, enacted by L.
9000, ch. 67, f 5.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 67 be-

came effective on May 1, 2000, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26.
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attempted theft by deception as well, because I think that's

2

part of the crime of forgery,

3

I've never gotten this far in a case that way,

4

just pled it out or pled to one count or another, and sometimes

5

it's been to my client's advantage to plead to the misdemeanor,

6

theft by deception, than to take a felony count.

7

But I don't think that because the State always

8

charges it that way that makes it correct.

9

been wrong (inaudible).

10

I've

I think it's always

I think theft by deception is part of

the crime of forgery because part of forgery is again, to try

11 I to fraud somebody, and part of fraud is to try to get something
12 I of value from somebody else.
13

THE COURT:

Thank you.

This motion, on the other

14

hand, is not surprising.

I have the same type of concerns, and

15

as I reviewed the Information before —

16

this jury trial today, and I spent a great deal of time reading

17

each of the statutes.

18

pictures of them and going back to my second grade diagraming

in my preparation for

I spent a great deal of time drawing

19 I of sentences and seeing what modifies what, and what applies to
20

what.

21

rely a great deal on what the attorneys argued before me today,

22

because I didn't get all of my questions answered with my own

23

research and my own pictures.

24
25

And I also determined at that time that I was going to

But I have had an opportunity to review it and I've
now had an opportunity to listen to the arguments that have
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been made vei

2

counts in the Information are appropriately charged as three

3

separate offenses, and that they can go to a trier of fact on

4

those —

5

well by both sides.

I am ruling that the three

all three charges.
I do not find that their overlap is so great that

6

there cannot be the different charges charged.

7

doing that is because I do find different and additional

8

elements in each of the offenses, which I think is what is

9

necessary in order to overcome any Shaundell problems. And

10

The reason I'm

those different elements need to be there.

11 I

It is true that Mr. O'Connell argues that the evidence

12

that we use in trying to show —

13

to show a theft by deception may very well be forgery-type of

14

conduct, or —

15

that the State tries to use in showing the fraud element of a

16

theft by deception or the identity fraud is the forgery.

17

that the State uses in trying

and it may even be that the type of evidence

But as I go through each one of these charges, there

18 I is separate elements that is required for each one.

In the

19

theft by deception, that they actually obtain or exercise

20

control over the property of someone by this deception. And

21

while the evidence of the identity fraud and the forgery is

22

part of the evidence with the deception, there is still the

23

additional element of obtaining and exercising control over the

24

property of Crown Furniture, in this case —

25

And also, the finance company, the evidence has been presented

Crown Bedrooms.
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to the jury that it is —

2

information to try to obtain the property belonging to those

3

victims separate and independent from what is being required in

4

the identity fraud.

5

that using that fraudulent

In the identity fraud it does actually require that

6

they obtain personal identifying information of another, and I

7

am persuaded by the State's argument that that is in addition

8

to the signing of a name.

9

A forgery can be a forgery if there is fraud, even if

10

it's not a real name, just a made-up name is a fraudulent

11

intent.

12

from the forgery is that they are obtaining identifying

13

personal information, and I think that that —

14

than just simply a name.

15

But the thing that makes a identity crime different

it requires more

And in this case evidence has been presented that the

16

date of birth and Social Security number and the information

17

that —

18

with fraudulent intent, including to get credit, is where it

19

differs the identity fraud from the theft by deception, in that

20

they are actually trying to exercise control over the property

the attempt to use this or the use of this information

21 I of Mr. Mewborn in this case.
22
23

His credit rating, he had to go back and close every
credit card.

His credit rating has been greatly affected, and

24 I so there really is yet another victim and other property, which
25

is specifically stated in the identity crime, that —

for using
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it to obtain credit is one of the goods, services, other areas

2

as well, in addition to the property of Crown Bedrooms or

3

American General Finance.

4

So that separates those two crimes, and then, as I

5

have stated earlier, that that is an additional element to the

6

forgery, which could be something as simple as signing a name

7

that doesn't even exist, if it's with the intent to have fraud.

8
9

So while all of the elements overlap and while the
evidence that is being presented to show that does overlap to a

10

certain extent, I find that there has been different elements

11

shown and argued in each one of the counts, and in fact, that

12

the evidence towards all of those elements have been presented

13 I by the State's witnesses at this time.
14

I don't know, Mr. O'Connell, if you actually made your

15

motion about the prima facia case, or you just said you wanted

16

to.

17
18

MR. O'CONNELL:

I did.

It was sort of at the

beginning.

19

THE COURT:

And we didn't argue it, if you wanted to.

20 I

MR. O'CONNELL:

One response, though.

My

21

understanding on what your ruling is that theft by deception

22

has an additional element that forgery doesn't have, and that's

23

that they gain property.

24

lesser included of the theft by deception.

25

same elements of the short one, you're a lesser included

If that's the case, then forgery is a
If you have all the
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offense, and so that's where it be the lesser included.

2

it's again it's —

3

the same thing.

4

So

it could be (inaudible) either/or but not

Then you talked about identity fraud and you

5

distinguished identity fraud because forgery can also have a

6

situation where there's a fictional person.

7

like there is an additional element that's in forgery that is

8

not in identity fraud, because a forgery can involve using the

9

identity of somebody else, but it's also an additional element.

Again, that sounds

10

If that's the case then identity fraud is a lesser included

11

offense of forgery.

12 I

I know they're different degrees, but I think when you

13

look at whether or not it's a lesser included, it's whether or

14

not you have all the same elements but in short form.

15

sounds like identity fraud has all the same elements that

16

forgery has, but forgery can be —

17

person, so we can take it one step farther.

18 I
19

So it

also have a fictional

So again, I think there should be only one count.

In

this case if they are a lesser included of each other, I guess

20 I it would be one count of theft by deception plus two counts of
21
22

a lesser included.
THE COURT:

And if the lesser included didn't also

23

involve the actual uttering or signing, then I might bite off

24

on that argument, but the additional element is forgery and

25

it's the actual uttering or signing of the other name —

of the
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(inaudible) purporting it to be the act of another.
So I — my ruling is that there are separate elements

3

and that they are —

4

on what your argument has been, Mr. O'Connell, and I don't

5

think that — but if you want the benefit of the record to put

6

any more of that on, you certainly may.

7

I certainly think that the record is clear

MR. O'CONNELL:

But—

I do, your Honor.

I guess I'm a

8

little unclear because the uttering is pretty broad.

In fact,

9

forgery is a little broad,. You're actually not signing

10 I anything to commit forgery.
11

THE COURT: That's right.

12 I

MR. O'CONNELL:

You pretty much can do anything to

13

commit a forgery as long as you're doing it with the purpose to

14

fraud in the act of another, and I don't see how you can have

15

identity fraud without uttering, signing, executing, all of the

16

many things you have in forgery.

I think it's impossible. And

17 I so I don't think that would be an additional element.
18

I don't

think you can commit identity fraud--

19

THE COURT: And the record reflects that.

20

MR. O'CONNELL:

Your Honor, also I do want to say that

21

the State hasn't made a prima facia case in this case and I

22

would ask for a directed verdict at this point.

23
24
25

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further than what's
been argued, Ms. Onton?
MS. ONTON:

We'll submit it, your Honor.

Addendum C

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 8B
1 9 9 9 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77

( D A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
History: C. 1963, 76-1-40* enacted by L.
1973, c b . 196,1 76-1-401; 1974, eh. 3 1 , 1 1.

Addendum D

INSTRUCTION NO.

7

Before you can convict the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES,
of the offense of Theft by Deception as charged in Count I of
the Information, you must find from all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following
elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 1st day of March, 2001, in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES,
intentionally or knowingly obtained or exercised control over
the property of CROWN tilih I ill L1,113 and/or AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE;
and
2.

That the defendant obtained or exercised control over

such property by deception; and
3.

That the defendant obtained or exercised control over

such property with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof; and
4.

That

the

value

of

the

property

was

or

exceeded

$5,000.00.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Theft by Deception as charged
in Count I of the Information.

If, on the other hand, you are

not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of
the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not
guilty of Count I.

INSTRUCTION NO.

g

"Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a
transfer

of

possession

or

of

some

other

legally

recognized

interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another.
"Property"

means

anything

of

value,

including

tangible

personal property and includes money.
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious objectifcto
withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to
use

under

economic

circumstances

value, or of

that

the use

a

substantial

and benefit

portion

of

its

thereof, would be

lost, or to restore the property only upon payment of a reward
or

other

compensation,

or

to

dispose

of

the

property

under

circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner will recover
it.
"Deception" occurs when a person intentionally
a)

Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression

of law or fact that is false and that the actor does not believe
to be true and that is likely to affect the judgment of another
in the transaction; or
b)

Fails to correct

a false

impression of

law or fact

that is false and that the actor previously created or confirmed
by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment of
another and that the actor does not now believe to be true; or
c)

Prevents another from acquiring information likely to

affect his judgment in the transaction; or
d)
judgment

Promises

performance

of another

that

is

likely

to

affect

the

in the transaction, which performance

the

INSTRUCTION NO.
Page 2
actor does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed;
provided, however, that failure to perform the promise in issue
without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient
proof that the actor did not intent! to perform or knew the
promise would not be performed.

INSTRUCTION NO.
A

person

intentionally

commits

Identity

obtains

personal

/3

Fraud

when

he

identifying

knowingly

information

or
of

another person without the authorization of that person and uses
or attempts to use that

information with

including

attempt

to

obtain

or

to

fraudulent intent,

obtain

credit,

goods,

services, any other thing of value or medical information in the
name of another person without the consent of that person.

INSTRUCTION NO

/^

Before you can convict the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES,
of the crime of Identity Fraud, as charged in Count II of the
Information,

you

must

find

from

the

evidence,

beyond

a

reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime:
1.

That on or about the 1st day of March, 2001, in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES,
as a party to the offense,
2.

knowingly or intentionally obtained personal

identifying

information

of

Jeffrey

Mewborn

without

the

authorization of Jeffrey Mewborn; and
3.

used or attempted to use that information with

fraudulent intent, including to obtain or attempt to obtain,
credit, goods, services, any other thing of value, or medical
information in the name of Jeffrey Mewborn without the consent
of Jeffrey Mewborn; and
4.

the value of the credit, goods, services, or any other

thing of value is or exceeds $5,000.00
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Identity Fraud as charged in
Count II of the information.

If, on the other hand, you are not

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty
of Count II.

INSTRUCTION NO.
To act with

"intent

I?

to defraud" or

"fraudulent intent"

means to act willfully, and with the specific intent to deceive
or cheat, ordinarily

for the purpose of either causing some

financial loss to another, or bringing about some financial gain
to oneself.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/Q,

Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of
Forgery

if

authenticates,

that

person

transfers,

makes,

publishes

or

completes,
otherwise

executes,
utters

any

writing so that the writing or the utterance purports to be the
act of another, and he does so with the purpose to defraud
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be
perpetrated by anyone.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/7

Before you can convict the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES,
of

the offense

of

Forgery

as charged

in Count

III of the

Information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of
that offense:
1.

That on or about the 1st day of March, 2001, in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES,
intentionally or knowingly made, executed, issued or uttered a
writing; and
2.

That said writing or utterance purported to be the act

of JEFFREY G. MEWBORN; and
3.

That said writing or utterance was not the act of

JEFFREY G. MEWBORN; and
4.

That said writing or utterance was not authorized by

JEFFREY G. MEWBORN; and
5.

That

the

said

defendant

then

and

there

knew

the

writing was not the act of JEFFREY G. MEWBORN and was not
authorized by JEFFREY G. MEWBORN; and
6.

That the said defendant then and there had a purpose

to defraud.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Forgery as charged in Count
III of the Information.

If, on the other hand, you are not

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the

foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty
of Count III.

a-\

INSTRUCTION NO.

/%

"Make" means to cause to exist or to form, fashion or
produce.
"Execute" means to make or to do.
"Issue" means to send forth, to emit; to promulgate; to put
into circulation; or to send out or go forth as authoritative or
binding.
"Utter" means to offer.
"Writing"

includes

transmission,

or

any

printing,
other

electronic

method

of

storage

recording

or

valuable

information including such forms as (a) checks, tokens, stamps,
seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any other
symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
security, revenue stamp, or any other

instrument

(b) a

or writing

issued by a government or any agency; or (c) a check, an issue
of

stocks,

bonds,

or

any

other

instrument

or

writing

representing an interest in or claim against property, or a
pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or enterprise.
A "purpose to defraud" is an intent to deceive another for
the purpose of gaining some material advantage over him or to
induce him to part with property, and to accomplish that purpose
by

some

false

statement,

false

pretense,

or

by

any

other

artifice or act designed to deceive.
"Facilitating

a

fraud"

means

to

make

easier

or

less

difficult a false statement, false pretense or any deceitful
practice which is intended to deceive another for the purpose of

gaining some material advantage over him or to induce him to
oart with property.
"Perpetrate" means to commit or to do.
"Purport" means to have the appearance of being.
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AMERICAN
GENERAL

Credit Applied For:
; Joint ^"individual
(A married applicant may apply for an individual account.;

FINANCE

39361

Date:

*PLICANT: For an individual account, please complete this section and sign in Section 3. (Please Print)
lame

First Name

Ml Suffix

nriK/ Number
KlumKAr
Social Security

Date of Birth

'

lT\ierWelrhf
ne Phone

#Dep.

Driver's License #

E-mail AddW
City

tESENT ADDRESS (Street Address or P.O. Box Number)

Mlfll I jfll+fr^klf lei |rf|7T

RESENT EMPLOYER (Name of Company)

]M

tie/Position

>!f|V\igir|^!(

•

Gross •

Zip Code

City

State;

Wl3oftjfi/
Employer Phone

Gross Q Monjhry

• •

Source

Monthly

State

rszr (SjsiB.Ka

•

rrr
sl^tolfiioiq

HM

ther Income

City

EH

*

income

Zip Code

<>U -h \Mk\t

Vl7lTloi Ife)
DEVIOUS ADDRESS (tf less than 3 yrs at present)
5T Mos

State

# Bank Cards
Type of Bank Account
• Checking • Savings

• Net
[ j Annual
limony, Child Support or Separate Maintenance Income Need Not Be Disclosed Unless Relied Upon For Credit.)
DEVIOUS EMPLOYER (if less than 3 yrs. at present)
Personal Reference (Not Irving with you)
—]

j

|

1

1 I

!

1

!

1

!

1

1

1

!

!

1

1

1

1

1

1

!

!

1

1

1

1

Mos.i
Buyjng

•

Own

Renting

Mtg. Balance

MoJ^flMg.Pmt

x

$

Reference Phone

Value of Home

W\U\Mo\c\

(\fW])mW\-\W7u

MNT APPLICANT: Complete this section only if this is a joint application and joint applicant will be contractually liable for repayment or if
cant is relying on another party's income. Joint applicant must sign in Section 3.
ame
First Name
Ml Suffix
Date of Birth
Social Security Number

on.

I
resent address is the same as above, check here: •

Relationship to Applicant: Q Spouse

i/cn/i
•

Home Phone

Non-spouse
J

IESENT ADDRESS (Street Address or P.O. Box Number)
l
. I

I k*

I

tie/Position
i

City

_]_

Mos.

I I I Ii

Income

I.

i i

i

her Income

•

Gross •

I II

i

I

IESENT E MPLOYER (Name of Company)
I

State

City

i

Monthly

Q Gross •

Monthly

•

Annual

Net

•

L

Zip Code

| |
State

I I Employer
I
Phone
,

(

Source

• Net
• Annual
imony, Child Support or Separate Maintenance Income Need Not Be Disclosed Unless Relied Upon For Credit.)

PLICANT/JOINT APPLICANT:Please read and sign below.
»r will submit your application to American General Finance, Inc. (AGF), P.O. Bex 59, Evansville, IN 47701, or its affiliate, which may buy your Retail Installment Sales Contract
may share with its affiliates any information regarding you or your application, acceptance, or credit experience with AGF. However, you may request that this information not be shared with affiliates
otifying AGF by mail or phone at the location shown above or by initialing this box: I
I 1
I Please DO NOT share information about me with your affiliates.

may investigate your creditworthiness (including obtaining credit reports and verifying employment information) AGF may request a consumer report from consumer reporting agencies in considering
credit application AGF may use any credit report obtained in connection with this application for future credit offers.
)M TIME TO TIME, AGF WILL NOTIFY YOU WHEN ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES ARE AVAILABLE, BY TELEPHONE AND/OR MAIL, AND THAT SUCH SERVICES MAY INCLUDE
30TIABLE CHECKS WHICH YOU MAY ENDORSE TO OBTAIN A LOAN, OR DESTROY IF YOU DO NOT WISH TO ACCEPT THE LOAN OFFER. IF YOU DO NOT WISH TO RECEIVE THESE
JCITATIONS, PLEASE STRIKE AND INITIAL THIS PARAGRAPH.
N YORK, OHIO, AND WISCONSIN RESIDENTS: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION.

-IANT USE ONLY
Seller's Fax

Tot. Purchase

W})\M£-mij3£

Trade-in

Dwn. Pmt. Amount

$! I ' / y ^ i W $i
Seller's Merchandise

Seller's Name

r

/7s?^^J

/z

?ZJC7YZ*V<

vv

O,-

Net Balance

NOTICE TO NEW YORK RESIDENTS
Upon your request, we will inform you whether or not we requested a consumer report on you and the name and
address of the consumer reporting agencies that furnished such reports.

NOTICE TO OHIO RESIDENTS:
The Ohio laws against discrimination require that all creditors make credit equally available to all credit worthy customers, and that credit reporting agencies maintain separate credit histones on each individual upon request The
Ohio Civil Rights Commission administers compliance with this law.

NOTICE OF WISCONSIN RESIDENTS:
No provision of any marital property agreement, a unilateral statement under §766.59 Wis. Stats, or a court decree
under §766.70 Wis. Stats, adversely affects the interest of the creditor unless the creditor, prior to the time the
credit is granted or an open-end credit plan is entered into, is furnished a copy of the agreement, statement or
decree or has actual knowledge of the adverse provision when the obligation to the creditor is incurred.
In addition, if I have applied for individual credit and I am married, I must send you the name and address of my
spouse within 15 days so that you can provide my spouse with the disclosure required under Wisconsin law.

STATE'S EXHIBIT
EXHIBfTMO
CASE NO
DATERECD
IN EVIDENCE

^-

Addendum F

PART 4
THEFT
76-6-401. Definitions.

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 8B
1999 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77

For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds,
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property,
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) l b withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) l b restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) l b dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee,
and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe
to be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his
judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without
disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal
impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien,
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not
a matter of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however,
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.
History: C. IMS, 76-6-401, enacted by L.
1973, eh. 196, t 76-6-401.

